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THE ANTITRUST CONVERSATION
STEPHEN CALKINS*
"It's an excellent brief, by the way. I have never met the lawyers who
wrote it, but it's an excellent brief." So observed Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson, during the hearing on Microsoft remedies, about an amicus brief
filed by two trade associations that had proposed a more aggressive
divestiture plan than the Justice Department.' Judge Jackson kicked off
the afternoon session with a series of detailed questions about that brief.2
No one can say that antitrust amicus efforts are ignored.
My favorite experience with antitrust amicus briefs is more humble.
Shortly after I began service as FTC General Counsel, Judge Richard
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit and functioning with his custom-
ary lightning speed, issued a decision in Blue Cross & Blue Shield United
v. Marshfield Clinic.3 In it, the court wrote that the defendant HMO was
not a monopolist "because HMOs are not a market."' 4 The court also
praised "most favored nations" clauses, which it described as "standard
devices by which buyers try to bargain for low prices," which is "the sort
of conduct that the antitrust laws seek to encourage. 5 A cautious reading
of the opinion would have kept these statements in context, but we
worried that observers and litigants might read them aggressively. They
were strong statements by a leading antitrust judge.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Professor Calkins was General
Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission from 1995 to 1997. This essay has benefited
from e-mail and oral discussions with many friends and colleagues and from a student
paper by Thomas W. Cronkright II. The author is grateful for the assistance but of course
accepts full responsibility for errors.
I Transcript of Proceedings, May 24, 2000, A.M. Session at 28, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., (D.D.C. No. 98-1232), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/
transcripts/may00/05-24-am.asp; see Joel Brinkley, Judge Suggests U.S. Remedy for Microsoft
Is Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000, at Al. The brief (available at http://eon.law.
harvard.edu/msdoj/amicus5-19-00.htm) was filed by the Computer and Communications
Industry Association and the Software and Information Industry Association.
2 Transcript of Proceedings, May 24, 2000, P.M. Session at 4-5, United States v. Microsoft
Corp. (D.D.C. No. 98-1232), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/
transcripts/mayO0/05-24-pm.asp.
3 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
4 Cf 65 F.3d at 1412..
5 Id. at 1415.
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The Antitrust Division and the FTC responded with an unusual amicus
brief. We took no position on the merits of the case but expressed
concern "that the Court's explanations of its conclusions on two issues
may mislead readers unfamiliar with the record and arguments in this
case as to the law applicable to market definition and analysis of 'most-
favored-nation' (MFN) agreements. 6 The brief urged the court to qualify
its opinion, for instance, by making clear "that its [MFN] ruling related
to the particular clause in the particular circumstances at issue in this
case and that other cases involving MFN clauses must be evaluated upon
their own facts." 7
Not long after the brief had been submitted, a thin envelope arrived
from the Seventh Circuit. Had Judge Posner, who is famous for not
suffering fools gladly, promptly penned an order declaring that the
antitrust agencies ought to disband if they had nothing better to do
than to help edit his opinions? Happily, no: the order made changes
responsive to our concerns (and otherwise denied the petition for rehear-
ing).8 It had been a productive antitrust conversation.
Marshfield Clinic served to solidify the affection in which I have long
held antitrust amicus briefs. Previous writings have noted the role that
amici have played in particular cases.9 The current essay reflects more
systematically on antitrust and trade regulation amicus efforts.
Amicus briefs certainly are popular. Whereas at the beginning of the
century amicus briefs were filed in only about 10 percent of Supreme
Court cases, today they are filed in 85 percent.10 The Supreme Court
6 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petition for Rehearing at 3-4, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield
Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
7 Id. at 8-9.
8 Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 29056 (7th Cir.
Oct. 13, 1995).
9 Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not A Quick Look But Not theFull Monty,
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000); Stephen Calkins, Copperweld in the Courts: The Road to
Caribe, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (1995); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court
Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1994); Stephen
Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amid, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269
(1993); Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Toward Greater
Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (1991); Stephen Calkins, Antitrust Law Developments 1989-
1990: The October 1989 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Power, Access, and Legitimacy, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 339 (1990); Stephen Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First Amend-
ment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1988). This essay includes some
of these observations in revised form and incorporates others by reference.
10Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 744 (2000). Although antitrust cases do not stimulate
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alone receives about 400 amicus briefs each year." Amicus briefs have
become so commonplace that the inevitable reaction has set in. 12
This essay unabashedly celebrates antitrust and trade regulation
amicus briefs. Ours is a small legal community. Amicus briefs are part
of the way that we debate legal issues and seek to influence the law.
Good amicus briefs can make a difference.' 3 Although many important
antitrust cases were written without benefit of amici (the absence of
which was sometimes sorely felt), 4 especially in the last couple of de-
the outpouring of posturing triggered by abortion, affirmative action, and free speech,
see id. at 831-34 (list of 34 cases with 20 or more amici briefs, 1946-95) (none antitrust),
the high stakes involved in some antitrust cases can lead to vigorous amicus practice and
strongly stated positions. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992) (17 amicus briefs); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984) (14 amicus briefs); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (labor antitrust)
(12 amicus briefs); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (international
jurisdiction) (11 amicus briefs); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990) (functional
discounts) (10 amicus briefs); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981) (no right to contribution) (15 amicus briefs); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (9 amicus briefs).
"1 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 752 (briefs filed per ten-year periods beginning
with 1946: 1946-531; 1956-743; 1966-2042; 1976-4182; 1986-4907).
12 Judge Posner has rebelled. "After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast
majority of which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be good to
scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a fish-eyed, fashion." Ryan v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming denial of
motion to file amicus brief). (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 permits a private
amicus brief only with the consent of all parties or leave of the court, and requires an
intended amicus to indicate "the reason why an amicus brief is desirable.") Reminding
us that "'amicus curiae' means friend of the court, not friend of a party," he held that
leave to file an amicus brief should be denied unless a party is not competently represented,
the amicus has an interest in another pending case that may be affected, or the amicus
"has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the
lawyers for the parties are able to provide." Id.
13 See Rule 37 of the United States Supreme Court ("An amicus curiae brief that brings
to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties may be of considerable help to the Court."); see also Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus
Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 603 (1984) (discussing cases where amicus briefs made a
difference); Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1981, at 83 (same). But cf Andrew P. Morriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme
Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823
(1999) (little influence seen in three cases studied).
14 E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 592 (1972); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961); Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) (existence of amici checked by Court opinion and PHILIP B. KURLAND
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cades, amicus participation has helped shape the doctrine we apply
every day.15
Amicus briefs stand out, as possibly having made a difference, in
several different ways, which are considered in turn below. Sometimes
an antitrust repeat player (typically the Government) takes a position
that is apparently against its litigating interest or is otherwise surprising
(casting against type). This gets noticed. Other times, it is the absence of
an obvious party, or the silence of parties present, that may make a
difference (sleeping dogs). A traditional way for amici to help is through
legal research. One critically important function is for repeat players-
again, typically the Government-to highlight egregious errors. Also impor-
tant is for amici to supply context and special emphasis. Finally, the glamor-
ous route to making a difference is through offering analytical constructs
found appealing by a court. There are several examples of this, including,
especially, in the development of the "quick look."
I. CASTING AGAINST TYPE
Attention is drawn any time an important antitrust repeat player takes
an unpredicted position. No court can lightly dismiss an amicus filing
by the Antitrust Division, the FTC, or the states that recommends a
resolution against their litigating interests. It should not be surprising
that some of the noteworthy defense-favoring outcomes were supported
& GERHARD CASPER EDS., ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955 TERM-1975 TERM (1979)). Because the
Solicitor General is the singularly most important antitrust amicus, amici played a relatively
less important role when so much antitrust law was being crafted through Government liti-
gation.
15 Before turning to amicus work that may have made a difference, a disclaimer is
essential. All speculating about the importance of amicus work is just that-speculating.
The judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, includes some of the greatest legal minds
of the day. Guessing whether a brief made a difference is inevitably problematic. One
can speculate that a cited amicus brief might be likely to be regarded by a court as of a
certain level of quality, but a recent study did not find that cited amicus briefs were more
likely to succeed than uncited ones. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 811-13. See
generally Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court: Assessing the Impact of
Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 187 (1991) (sample showed that only one-third of amicus citations were evidence of
impact). This essay considers some interesting amicus briefs identified by selective sampling
or suggested by respondents to a list-serve inquiry, and, as by examining shadows and
guessing the source thereof, reflects on whether certain briefs might have made a differ-
ence. The reader is urged to consider this just part of a discussion about antitrust litigation.
Readers with alternative favorite amicus briefs or differing speculations about the role of
particular briefs (and especially readers who participated in litigating some of the cited
cases) are warmly invited to enrich future commentary by sharing their differing perspec-
tives with the author.
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by Government amicus work. Perhaps most strikingly, it became hard
to imagine that the Supreme Court would hold onto the per se rule
against vertical resale price maintenance once the Antitrust Division and
the FIFC (led by Joel Klein and Robert Pitofsky, respectively) counseled
against doing so in State Oil Co. v. Khan.16 There are many other examples
of Government-supported opinions that favor defendants. 7
Two unusual examples of amici making surprising declarations occur-
red in the October 1991 term. In Kodak, the defendant's economically
sophisticated "life cycle costing" argument stumbled on real-world amicus
testimony. Public purchasing officials insisted that because states require
competitive bidding and governments often separate budget responsibil-
ity for purchasing and operating, "Kodak's economic theory is largely
irrelevant to the real world of public purchasing.' 8 The Court cited the
public purchasers' brief and an amicus brief filed by twenty-nine states
to support its doubts about the frequency with which customers engage
in effective life cycle costing. 9 Similarly, in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co.,20 a state action case, five title insurance companies sought to portray
themselves as champions of federalism that objected to the FTC's med-
dling in state regulatory matters, only to find that thirty-three states
(including four of the five allegedly championed states) sided with the
FIC.21 The Solicitor General observed that with the FTC and the states
16 522 U.S. 3 (1997); see Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission
as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, Khan. But cf Brief for Thirty-Three States and the
Territory of Guam in Support of Respondents, Khan (contrary views to those of Solicitor
General); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 521 U.S. 1116 (1997) (granting states' motion for leave
to participate in oral argument as amici curiae).
17 E.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan,
506 U.S. 447 (1993); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1984);Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Falls City Indus., Inc. v.
Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S.
1 (1979); cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (Solicitor
General for defendant, state attorneys general for plaintiff).
18 Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass'n of State Purchasing Officials and National Insti-
tute of Governmental Purchasing, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 8 (adding that few
purchasing officials would prefer future savings to a low initial cost because life cycle
costing is "notoriously difficult and imprecise"), Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
19 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 475; see also id. at 479 n.28 (citing states and a private amicus for
allegations that buyers are worse off when a manufacturer controls service and parts). A
brief submitted by Public Citizen, also in support of Image Technical, disagreed with
Kodak's vision of how the world of purchasing works. Image Techical's lawyer thought
the brief so useful that he called the Court's attention to it during oral argument. Kodak,
Official Transcript at 40, 1991 U.S. Transcript LEXIS 213 at *35 (Dec. 10, 1991).
20 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
21 See Brief of Amicus Curiae States of Wisconsin et al., Ticor, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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in agreement that antitrust enforcement was essential, "only the foxes
are insisting that they were not left to guard the henhouse. 22
A particularly intriguing example of casting against type is provided
by one of the controverted cases of the modern era, Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society.23 This 4-3 plaintiff's victory can be better under-
stood by recognizing the simple fact that AAG William Baxter signed an
amicus brief supporting the plaintiff.24 The dissenters portrayed two
medical foundations as having crafted an innovative means of delivering
medical care at lower prices. The plan was seen as a noncoercive way to
create a new insurance product and control medical costs.Justice Powell's
dissent claimed that the arrangement was indistinguishable from Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 21 and that the district
court had properly refused plaintiff's request for summary judgment.
FourJustices-Stevens (author of the only Broadcast Music dissent), Bren-
nan, Marshall, and, most importantly, Justice White (author of Broadcast
Music)-disagreed and declared the arrangement per se illegal. 26
There was a change of Antitrust Division command between the filing
of the Solicitor General's (SG's) amicus brief on whether to grant certio-
rari and his amicus brief on the merits. The first brief was filed February
18,1981, under President Reagan, but still nominally under AAG Sanford
Litvack. It was a straightforward defense of the applicability of the per
se rule to the conduct in question, even going so far as to suggest
considering summary reversal. Although the SG's merits brief, filed May
28, 1981 (two months after AAG Baxter had officially taken office) is
quite different,27 it still called for the reversal of the court of appeals,
argued that Broadcast Music differed substantially, and declared the
restraints at issue illegal without further scrutiny because the doctors'
fixing of prices was not necessary to the achievement of the claimed
procompetitive benefits.
The majority opinion largely follows these aspects of the SG's argu-
ment, although the points are not novel and were also made by Petitioner.
The mere fact that AAG Baxter-neither a shrinking violet nor a fan of
22 Reply Brief for the Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Ticor, 504 U.S.
621 (1992).
23 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
24 In retrospect, Bill Baxter said that he was "intensely displeased with myself and my
staff" over the brief. William F. Baxter, Preface to a Review of Antitrust Division Briefs, 15 J.
REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. i, xvi (1985).
25 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussed infra at 653).
26 Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 334. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined
the dissent. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor did not participate.
27 See infra at 653-54.
[Vol. 68
THE ANTITRUST CONVERSATION
over-reliance on per se rules-joined in the summary condemnation of
these restraints may have provided important comfort to Justice White,
who supplied the key vote for what Baxter later labeled "the most serious
doctrinal error that the Court made during my tenure."
28
II. SLEEPING DOGS
Ironically, it is sometimes the lack of an amicus position that can make
a difference. In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,29 the SG filed an amicus brief
that addressed the intersection of antitrust and labor law (in particular,
the applicability' of the implied labor exemption after bargaining had
reached impasse). With the SG on the brief were the Antitrust Division
and the FTC, but not the National Labor Relations Board. Instead, a
footnote reported that the NLRB "concurs that the court of appeals'
expansive formulation of the labor exemption is wrong as a matter of
law, and may do serious harm to the nation's antitrust and labor policies
if not reversed."" As a result, Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace
could not begin his argument before being asked why the National Labor
Relations Board was not on the Government's brief."1 When Wallace
explained that the NLRB "was undergoing some transitions in member-
ship," a Justice acerbically asked whether the AFL-CIO had a vacancy,
and noted that the lack of an amicus brief from it was "rather surpris-
ing. 32 Later, a Justice complained about an issue on which he would
normally "look to the board for guidance."33 Still later, when a Justice
noted that the NLRB disagreed with the judgment below, counsel for
respondents rejoined, "But we don't know why, Your Honor, and I suggest
that part of the reasons that we don't know why is that the board is not
prepared to sign on to some of the views of the labor laws that are
articulated in the Solicitor General's brief .... ,,31 The side befriended
by the SG lost, 8-1.
Perhaps the most noteworthy silence by antitrust amici (and litigants)
was found in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 35 the landmark
case that brought the rule of reason to all nonprice vertical restraints.
28 Baxter, supra note 24, at xvi.
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
30 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 13 n.10, 1995 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 338 (Jan. 19, 1996). Mine was
one of the names on this brief.
31 1996 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 30 at *13 (Mar. 27, 1996).
32 Id. at *14.
33 Id. at *23-*24.
34 Id. at *36-*37.
35 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Although the case that marks the turning point toward modern antitrust
law,36 GTE Sylvania attracted only three amicus briefs, all private.17 Those
briefs supplied important special emphasis, as is discussed below,38 but
no advocate suggested judging vertical price restraints under the rule
of reason. To the contrary, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers wrote that
the Court "need have no concern that upholding location clauses would
in any way impair the validity of the per se rule against minimum resale
price maintenance, and we explicitly disavow any such position in this
brief. " 3 9
In fact, it was plaintiff-petitioners who made the case for treating price
and nonprice restraints the same:
The first salient thing about the [Ninth Circuit] majority's economic
theory is that it draws no distinction between vertical price restrictions,
vertical restraints on resale areas in the Schwinn form or vertical
restraints on resale areas in the Sylvania form. If the economic view
embraced below is accepted as the Sherman Act standard, then this
Court's decisions in Schwinn and in Dr. Miles are just as wrong as was
the decision by the trial judge in this case.40
Petitioner's brief noted that "[t]he one thing that Professor Bork and
economists who insist on the harmfulness of vertical restraints agree
upon is that resale price fixing and resale area restraints have essentially
the same purpose and effect."'" "[E]very justification that can be offered
for a Schwinn or Sylvania resale restraint can as plausibly and convincingly
be offered for a Dr. Miles restraint."42
The Court dismissed the argument and reassured itself that the distinc-
tion between price and nonprice restrictions was clear and secure.4 3 What
if Respondent's amici had been more forthright about their logic and
. For discussion of the singular status of GTE Sylvania, see Symposium, The Effect of GTE
Sylvania on Antitrust Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 11 et seq. (1991).
37 See Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n
as Amicus Curiae (Motor Vehicle Amicus); Motion of Int'l Franchise Ass'n for Leave to
File Brief Amicus Curiae (IFA Amicus); and Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae
on Behalf of the Associated Equipment Distributors, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
The brief filed by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association notably was signed by
Harvard Law School Professor Donald F. Turner (of counsel).
"8 See infra at 640-43.
19 Motor Vehicle Amicus Brief at 6 n.1; see also id. at 45 & n.74; IFA Amicus at 16 (per
se rule for price restraints appropriate). The defendant-respondent also wrote reassuringly
about the easiness of a price-nonprice distinction. See Respondent's Brief at 62-64.
40 Brief for Petitioners at 50.
11 Id. at 51 n.16.
412 Petitioners' Reply Brief at 14.
43 Subsequently, of course, critics from the academic right joined Professors Sullivan
and Choper in criticizing the attempted distinction. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Next Step
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their preferences, and championed rule of reason treatment for all
vertical restraints? Had they set forth a consistent story about the benefits
they perceived from vertical price and nonprice restraints, alike, would
the Court have gone along? My guess is to the contrary. A powerful
amicus presentation on the identicalness of all vertical restraints effects
more likely would have spooked the Court into affirming the Ninth
Circuit on that court's grounds, by limiting Schwinn and leaving the
ramifications thereof for another day. Amici were quiet, which may have
made all the difference.
III. LEGAL RESEARCH
One of the classic ways that amici can help courts is through legal
research. 4 Of course, when information is in the public domain, one
can never know what the Court would have discovered on its own. Yet
when the Court relies significantly on legal and economics secondary
sources discussed by amici and not the parties, as occurred, for instance,
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,45 it is at least possible
that amici made a difference.
A classic example of apparent amici research assistance is found in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, which held that Arizona's banning of lawyer
advertising was antitrust-protected state action that unconstitutionally
interfered with protected speech (lawyer advertising) .46 The Court's opin-
ion, by Justice Blackmun, is positively scholarly in its review of the litera-
ture on the (net benefits) of lawyer advertising. Although again causation
is difficult to prove, the Court may have benefited from the amicus brief
filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork.41 That brief, which recommended
the outcome reached by the Court, was itself unusually compendious.
Attached to it were three appendices of secondary sources, one of which
in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981);
Robert Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171.
" E.g., Stephen M. Shapiro, Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, 10 LITIG., No. 3 (1984).
Indeed, the original common law function of amici was to identify cases with which a
judge was not familiar. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1963). For concern that amici communication of social science
information (or misinformation) may mislead as well as inform, see Michael Rustad &
Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs,
72 N.C. L. REv. 91 (1993).
45 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see Calkins, Revenge, supra note 9, at 293-94.
46 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
47 Compare, e.g., 433 U.S. at 371 ("It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a
rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics.") (referencing H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
5, 210-11 (1953)) with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28 ("The ban
on advertising seems to have originated as a rule of etiquette rather than of ethics.")
(referencing DRINKER).
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was cited by the Court,48 and an appendix that extended the briefs
argument specifically to address lawyer advertising, parts of which which
are closely echoed in the Court's opinion." Although in its California
Dental Association opinion 0 the FTC referenced some secondary sources
and the Bates Court's salute to professional advertising, the agency must
regret that an amicus failed to play for it the same explicatory role that
the SG played for John Bates.
One of the best examples of effective specialized amicus legal research
concerned the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," and, in particular,
whether that Act governed efforts by third parties to collect dishonored
checks. With the district courts disagreeing on this surprisingly enigmatic
question, the FTC filed an amicus brief that set out what the Seventh
Circuit apparently found a compelling explication of legislative history
demonstrating that the Act should be so applied. 2 The Commission
eventually filed similar amicus briefs in three other circuits, 5 3 all of which
agreed with the agency and reversed contrary district courts. 4
IV. SPOTLIGHTING EGREGIOUS ERRORS
A singularly important role played by the antitrust agencies is in letting
the courts know about serious mistakes. Conceivably some private parties
have played this role, but the Government is usually the only entity with
the credibility to claim that, looking impartially at a matter, a court got
something grievously wrong.
Two of the best-known examples of the Government pointing to seri-
ous antitrust error are Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.55 and Catalano, Inc.
18 433 U.S. at 370 n.22 (citing Petition of the Board of Governors of the District of
Columbia Bar for Amendments to Rule X of the Rules Governing the Bar of the District
of Columbia (1976), reprinted as Exhibit B to the Appendix of the SG's brief, and
discussing data about consumer overestimates of costs for particular legal services).
11 Compare433 U.S. at 370 n.22 with SG Amicus Brief, Appendix A at 5a n.10 (referencing
and quoting from same ABA report about consumer ignorance deterring use of legal ser-
vices).
10 California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996).
5115 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o.
52 Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997) (available from author) (plain language
and legislative history show that Act should apply to collection of dishonored checks); see
Bass, 111 F.3d at 1327 n.8 (discussing FTC amicus brief). The Seventh Circuit appeared
to rely heavily on the Commission's chronicling of a rejected meaning in a subsequently
replaced bill, see FTC Amicus Brief at 5-7. ErnestJ. Isenstadt, then-FTC Assistant General
Counsel, was principally responsible for the brief.
13 The briefs are available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs.htm.
51 Snow v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 143 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1998); Duffy v. Landberg, 133
F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1998); Charles v. Lundgren & Assocs., P.C., 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1997).
55 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam). The case is discussed in Calkins, supra note 9.
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v. Target Sales, Inc.5 6 In Palmer, the Court's per curiam reversal of the
Eleventh Circuit reads like a straightforward reaffirmation of the per se
rule against horizontal market division. The picture is one of doctrinal
tranquility-just as a duck gliding over a pond may seem graceful in
spite of its furious paddling below the surface.
Although the factual complexity underlying Palmer 7 was unimportant
to antitrust law, the court of appeals had erred importantly when it
affirmed the district court's conclusion (on summary judgment) that it
was not unlawful for geographically adjacent competitors to agree to
refrain from entering each other's territory. The United States and the
FTC illuminated the error in an amicus brief that pointedly recom-
mended the granting of certiorari and summary reversal: 58
Although the court of appeals' treatment of the per se claims in this
case is erroneous and apparently in conflict with this Court's long-
standing precedents concerning the per se rule, we nevertheless do not
urge plenary review. If, as we believe, the court of appeals did radically
misinterpret and misstate governing precedent concerning the applica-
tion of the per se rule to horizontal conspiracies, its errors are so
clear as to require no further briefing or argument in this Court ...
Moreover, we see no useful purpose to be served by further review of
this case merely to resolve ambiguity concerning which path the courts
below took in going astray. 9
The Supreme Court, with only Justice Marshall dissenting (based on his
longstanding objection to the use of summary procedures) and Justice
Souter not participating, agreed.
In Catalano, the SG and thirty-eight states protested the Ninth Circuit's
undermining of the per se rule by evaluating horizontal agreements to
eliminate short-term credit under the rule of reason. The SG wrote that
the "court of appeals' holding that a conspiracy to eliminate free trade
credit is not a form of price fixing is both erroneous and important. '60
A strong (and correct) dissent had already improved the chances for
certiorari. The SG suggested that the Court might want to consider
summary reversal, 61 which it did several months later.
Spotlighting egregious errors occurs not just at the Supreme Court
level but at the court of appeals level as well. Indeed, the antitrust
56 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam).
57 See Calkins, Toward Greater Certainty, supra note 9, at 606 n.13.
58 Brief for the United States [with the FTC] as Amicus Curiae, Palmer, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
11 Id. at 15.
60 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
61 Id. at 7 n.5.
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agencies may play a more decisive role at lower levels of the judicial
system. The Supreme Court expects to hear the Government's views on
almost every case, and usually retains sufficient accumulated antitrust
expertise to recognize obvious mistakes. Not so the courts of appeal.
Although attempts to alert courts of appeal to clear errors are not
always successful (for instance, the Antitrust Division unsuccessfully sup-
ported rehearing en banc in Palmer62), there have been some noteworthy
success. Three that stand out are Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories
Corp.,63 Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland General Electric Co.,64 and
Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C. v. Hospital Service District No. 1.65
Systemcare reflected a determined effort to beat back a mischievous
and potentially pernicious undermining of antitrust enforcement. The
Tenth Circuit, giving an unusual meaning to the word "agreement," had
said that a tying agreement between a buyer and seller was not an
"agreement" for purposes of Sherman Act Section 1.66 When a district
court squarely so read Tenth Circuit case law, 67 the Antitrust Division
urged the Tenth Circuit to interpret those cases in a more limited
fashion. 6 After a Tenth Circuit panel, with some justification, ruled that
the Division's interpretation was "unnecessarily tortured,"69 the Division
successfully supported rehearing en banc. 70 In its brief supporting rehear-
ing and its subsequent merits brief, it set forth the mischief that the
panel's opinion could work on the law of exclusive dealing, resale price
62 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 7 n.6, 1989 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1667
(Sept. 17, 1990), Palmer, 498 U.S. 46 (1990). For an unsuccessful argument that a court
of appeals had improperly upheld an award of summary judgment based on claimed easy
entry, see Brief for Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Appellant, Advo, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 1995), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0477.htm. SeeAdvo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10775 (May 11, 1995) (denying petition for rehearing en banc).
63 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
64 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
11 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 398 (1999).
66 See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992);
McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
67 Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 787 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1992), affd, 85 F.2d
465 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
66 Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of Appellant, Systemcare,
Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 85 F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1996), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f04O0/0480.htm.
69 85 F.3d at 470.
70 Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of Rehearing En Banc
(June 11, 1996), Systemcare, 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f600/O681.htm.
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maintenance, and all of vertical restraints. 7' The en banc Tenth Circuit
unanimously vacated the panel opinion and overruled prior Tenth Cir-
cuit case law.72
One of the more dramatic instances of Antitrust Division intervention
occurred in Columbia Steel. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that private
conduct was immunized by the state action doctrine "if it is a foreseeable
result of state agency action and if circumstances justify an inference
that the agency intended to authorize the conduct." 73 The Antitrust
Division filed a brief in support of rehearing that carefully set forth the
nature of the error made 74 and made clear that this was serious error.75
Persuaded, the court withdrew its previous opinion and replaced it with
an opinion changing the case's outcome:
We are persuaded by Columbia Steel's petition for rehearing and an
amicus curiae brief filed by the Antitrust Division of the department
of justice that we erred in allowing a foreseeability test to be substituted
for the clear articulation test of Midcal....
As the Antitrust Division puts it, 'express authorization [is] the necessary
predicate for the Supreme Court's foreseeability test.' PGE cites no case
to the contrary and we know of none.76
Any time a court is turned around that sharply and with that amount
of attention to the Government's views, one has to suspect that the
Government made a difference.
A similarly sharp reversal of position occurred in Surgical Care, although
the importance of the Government's role is less strikingly clear. A panel
71 Id. at 10-11; En Banc Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant at 15-17 (Oct. 4, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0900/
0944.htm.
72 Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997) (referring to
the Division's brief).
71 Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
74 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America in Support of Petition for
Rehearing at9 (Aug. 15,1985) ("While the Supreme Court's [foreseeability] test is whether
the anticompetitive effects are a foreseeable result of authorized conduct, the panel asked
whether the 'private conduct.., is a foreseeable result of state agency action."'), Columbia
Steel, 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997).
75 Id. at 8 ("the panel's standard ... departs from the Supreme Court's formulation,
misconceives the foreseeability test, and fails to achieve the Court's purposes in imposing
the requirement").
76 111 F.3d at 1443-44 (brackets by court; citation to Division brief omitted). When the
defendant subsequently sought certiorari, the Court invited the views of the United States,
522 U.S. 803 (1997), which were duly filed (successfully recommending denial of certio-
rari). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Portland General Elec. Co. v. Columbia
Steel Casting Co., (Apr. 15, 1998), 523 U.S. 1112 (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases/f1600/1637.htm.
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had ruled that a hospital service district (which it considered a political
subdivision) enjoyed antitrust immunity "if its anticompetitive conduct
is the foreseeable result of the statutory scheme."' T7 Although this ruling
found support in some Supreme Court language, 7 it would immunize
a great deal. The two antitrust agencies pointed this out (in a brief
supporting rehearing en banc) by referencing Adam Smith's observation
about the predictability of efforts to lessen competition. 79 In that brief
and a subsequent brief on the merits, the agencies warned of the "danger-
ous consequences" of a rule silently conferring immunity for any
attempted lessening of competition pursuant to a mere authorization
for a political subdivision to compete in the marketplace.80 A unanimous
en banc Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed the judgment of dismissal that
had previously been upheld.81
V. SPECIAL EMPHASIS
Sometimes an amicus brief can emphasize an aspect of a case so
effectively that the case appears quite different than it otherwise might.
Without necessarily introducing whole new themes, amici have under-
scored and developed points, added examples, and given depth to the
picture presented. Such cases include Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc. 82 and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc."
77 153 F.3d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 398 (1999).
71 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) ("It is
enough ... if suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute
authorizes.") (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 33, 42 (1985)).
79 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 8 n.3, Surgical Care Center, 171 F.3d 231,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2OOO/2052.htm.
s0 Id. at 9; Supplemental En Banc Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission as Amici Curiae Urging Reversal in Support of Appellant, at 18, Surgical Care
Center, 171 F.3d 231, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2200/2229.htm.
81 171 F.3d at 235 (pointing to the subtle but important distinction "between a statute
that in empowering a municipality necessarily contemplates the anticompetitive activity
from one that merely allows a municipality to do what other businesses can do"). The
same issue had been raised in another Fifth Circuit case, Willis-Knighton Medical Center v.
City of Bossier City, 2 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. La. 1997), rev'd without opinion, 178 F.3d 1290
(5th Cir. 1999), in which the two antitrust agencies also filed an amicus brief. Brief for
the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant, Willis-Knighton 178 F.3d 1290, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f1600/1621.htm. The court of appeals reversed the district court without opinion shortly
after issuing its opinion in Surgical Care.
82 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
83 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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A. KLOR'S
Klor's is the famous boycott case which long led ajanus-faced existence
as alternatively a horizontal and a vertical case. 84 Petitioner focused
attention on the harm done to a "single trader," on "the use of monopoly
chain buying power by a large interstate competitor who has sought to
eliminate the competition of the petitioner," and on the defendants'
alleged "specific intent to monopolize." 85 The Solicitor General refo-
cused attention on the allegation that "10 manufacturers and their affili-
ated distributors had conspired with each other and with petitioner's
competitor" and the absence of any efficiency justification for the boy-
cott.86 Philip Elman, from the SG's office, made this clear early in his
argument, describing an allegation of "a 'suppliers' group boycott,"'
which, among other things, "restrains competition among the parties
to the agreement" because "[t]hey are no longer competing with one
another" for Klor's business.87 Elman made sure the Court realized that
it was looking at a horizontal concerted refusal to deal without any
asserted efficiency justification. 88
B. GTE SYLVANIA
Another good example is provided by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., the vehicle for the Court to undo the mischief it had caused
when, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,89 it had gone beyond the
argument of the Justice Department and held that a manufacturer's
restraints on resale were per se illegal when a manufacturer sought to
impose them after parting with title. GTE Sylvania was a struggling firm
s4 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal (Nov. 11,
1984) at 7 n.11, available in LEXIS ("There is disagreement over the extent to which the
horizontal or vertical nature of the restraint should determine whether the per se rule is
applied.") (citing authorities), Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284 (1984).
85 Petitioner's Opening Brief at 4, 16 (question presented and summary of argument),
Klor's, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
86 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, 11.
87 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9; see also id. at 16-17 ("But in this case you've got a
little man across the street from ... Macy's saying that Macy's went to all his big suppliers
and said to them: You enter an agreement with each other binding each of you not to
sell to this litte fellow across the street from me, for reasons ... which are not specifically
alleged in the complaint.").
88 The clarity of the issue before the Court in K/or's makes it particularly unfortunate
that courts and commentators subsequently debated whether K/ors turned on horizontal
(as opposed to merely vertical) agreement. Only two years ago, a party urged the Court
to treat K/ors as applicable also to vertical agreement-an invitation it declined while
putting the issue firmly to rest. Brief for Respondent, at 19, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,
525 U.S. 128 (1998); see also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734
(1988) (describing Klors as horizontal case).
- 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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that sought to preserve a distribution network by preventing too-free
transhipping, and the Ninth Circuit had thought this distinguished the
situation from Schwinn. Boalt Hall Law Professors Jesse Choper and
Lawrence A. Sullivan, with a private practitioner, viewed this as an assault
on Schwinn calling for the Court's attention and petitioned for certiorari.
The petition ends with a ringing challenge: "If Schwinn is to be overruled,
it should be overruled by this Court, and overruled candidly .... 90
The Court accepted the challenge. Given the changed composition
of the Court,9" the tide of criticism that had washed over Schwinn in
the decade it had been on the books, and the attractiveness of the
competitively tiny GTE Sylvania's story, the granting of certiorari in GTE
Sylvania probably sounded the death knell of Schwinn. Even if its death
was inevitable, however, the nature of its burial was unresolved.
Although the GTE Sylvania amici did not make novel arguments or
uncover unusual facts, they supplied emphasis and detail.9 2 Respondent
GTE was obliged to defend the Ninth Circuit's decision to distinguish
Schwinn, and only argued in the alternative for its overruling. 93 The
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) was not similarly
constrained and led with the essential argument:
This amicus brief also sets forth the underlying economic principles
which support the assertion that the use by manufacturers of vertical
restraints on the locations of dealers may be beneficial to competition
and consumer welfare. A manufacturer and the consumers of its prod-
uct want the same thing from a distributional system: maximum effec-
90 Petition for Certiorari at 22, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36:
If Schwinn is to be overruled, it should be overruled by this Court, and overruled
candidly; it should not be dispatched by the court below in a specious majority
opinion. If Schwinn is to be modified, it should be modified by this Court, with
deliberation, not left to unravel as other courts and commentators, encouraged
by the decision below, begin to pick at it. If Schwinn is to remain the law, this
Court must clearly teach that the majority below is wrong and does not have the
power to reduce Schwinn to a legal exercise devoid of force or principle.
91 Only Justice Brennan remained from the five-member Schwinn majority.
912 As discussed above at 632, amici also may have made a difference by refraining from
advocating rule of reason treatment for price restraints. Respondent and amici alike spilled
much ink setting forth the deficiencies and ill-repute of the line Schwinn had drawn for
per se illegality. The Court joined in the chorus. It noted that, "as one commentator has
observed, many courts 'have struggled to distinguish or limit Schwinn in ways that are a
tribute to judicial ingenuity."' 433 U.S. at 48 n.14 (quoting Robinson, Recent Developments:
1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 272 (1975)). It quoted Donald Baker's charge that Schwinn
was "'an exercise in barren formalism' that is 'artificial and unresponsive to the competitive
needs of the real world."' 433 U.S. at 48 n.13 (quoting Donald Baker, Vertical Restraints
in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975)).
93 Brief for Respondent GTE Sylvania at 51-65, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36.
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tiveness at minimum cost. Every manufacturer has an economic interest
in having its product marketed effectively at the lowest possible cost.94
This equating of manufacturer and consumer interests was a central
aspect of GTE Sylvania.9 5 Although the same point was also made by
respondent,9 6 the MVMA highlighted the point by putting it up front
and then hammering it home through repetition and reemphasis.97
Also important to GTE Sylvania was the Court's explanation that "[v] er-
tical restrictions promote interbrand competition" and permit the
achievement of "efficiencies."9 8 The Court mentioned the aiding of new
competitors, promotional activities, service and repair functions, war-
ranty obligations, and "the so-called 'free-rider' effect."99 This theme
was included in Respondent's brief, which posited that "non-price vertical
restraints may, and frequently do, promote interbrand competition." °10
It was elaborated on importantly by amici. The MVMA wrote at length
about the benefits of limiting distribution, discussing servicing, the fed-
eral warranty law referenced by the Court, and the dollar magnitude of
the dealer investments that need to be encouraged.101 It thoroughly
94 Motor Vehicle Amicus at 3.
9 433 U.S. at 56 & n.24:
Economists also have argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in
maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient
distribution of their products.... In this context, a manufacturer is likely to view
the difference between the price at which it sells to its retailers and their price
to the consumer as its "cost of distribution," which it would prefer to minimize.
(quoting Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REs'. 282,
283 (1975), and citing Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division [II], 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966)).
96 Respondent quoted a student note that the Court also quoted: "Generally a manufac-
turer would prefer the lowest retail price possible, once its price to dealers has been set,
because a lower retail price means increased sales and higher manufacturer revenues."
Note, 88 HARV. L. REv. 636, 641 (1975), quoted in Brief for Respondent at 47 and 433
U.S. at 56 n.24.
17 Motor Vehicle Amicus at 44 ("the manufacturer has an interest in getting the product
distributed in the most efficient and effective way possible"); id. at 46 ("manufacturers
may be presumed to select the most efficient, least costly means of distribution, for it is
in their economic interest to do so").
98 Id. at 54.
99 433 U.S. at 55.
100 Respondent's Brief at 59 (citing, among other authorities, Preston, Restrictive Distribu-
tion Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
506 (1965), which the Court, 433 U.S. at 55, cited for the same point); see also id. at 45
n.38 (discussing a California warranty act also cited by the Court, 433 U.S. at 55 n.23); id.
at 46 (quoting student note explaining how location clauses can help weaker manufacturers
achieve distribution).
101 Motor Vehicle Amicus at 9-24.
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reviewed "free-riding," citing the two authorities subsequently referenced
by the Court.10 2
Ironically, for all the legal talent that worked as advocates in GTE
Sylvania, some of the Court's most important expressions of views are
not tightly rooted in the briefs of parties or amici. The ringing assertion
that "[i]nterbrand competition is ... the primary concern of antitrust
law"'13 had profound implications for distribution law. One can find
support for the concept, but not the declaration itself, in the briefs.10 4
More fundamentally, Schwinn was the case in which the Court wedded
antitrust to modern economics. The Court declared "that departure
from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable
economic effect, rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line draw-
ing."1"5 It squarely rejected Ninth CircuitJudge Browning's concern for
"the autonomy of independent businessmen."'0 6 "Competitive econo-
mies have social and political as well as economic advantages, but an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks."10 7 Given the Court's setting out these views that
lack close parallels in the briefs, it would be rash to claim that amici
influenced the Court's opinion. 1°8 One can say, however, that amici
02 Compare Motor Vehicle Amicus at 18 (citing Posner, supra note 95, at 285, and PAUL
SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 506-07 (10th ed. 1976)) with 433 U.S. at 55 (citing same pages).
Respondent had also relied on Posner to make its "free-riding" argument. Respondent's
Brief at 62. The International Franchise Association also highlighted b6th "free-riding"
and the problem of the struggling competitor. IFA Amicus at 17-18.
103 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
104 Cf Respondent's Brief at 61 ("To posit that this consequence of the Schwinn per se
language yields increased intrabrand competition misses the point. For the issue, surely,
is not the mere enhancement of such 'competition', but whether it is the type of competi-
tion which, as a matter of antitrust policy, ought to be preserved, particularly when the
cost of so doing is injury to other forms of competition. We respectfully suggest that it is
not, at least on a per se basis.").
105 433 U.S. at 58-59.
106 Id. at 53 n.21.
107 Id. (citation omitted).
108 Any speculation about Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in GTE Sylvania needs
to note that Tyler Baker, a former student of Bill Baxter later to head Baxter's Guidelines
project, clerked for Justice Powell at the time. See Richard Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the
Antitrust Arena: An Economist's Appreciation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1328 n.41 (1999).
Also missing from the GTE Sylvania briefs was much discussion about just how courts
were supposed to go about the prescribed balancing of harm to intrabrand competition
against gain to interbrand competition. Cf Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De
Facto Legality Underthe Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68 (1991) ("Courts, and indeed
economists, are ill equipped to carry out the Supreme Court's instruction to balance the
conflicting effects that economic theory attributes to vertical restraints, much less to
determine whether the net result of a particular restraint is on balance to impede or to
'promote[] competition.") (citing GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15). Petitioners warned
that "where, as here, a restraint has been imposed on intra-brand competition, the Court
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presented the kind of emphasis and detail that could have made a dif-
ference.
VI. ANALYHICAL CONSTRUCTS
The most glamorous role for an amicus is to contribute an analytical
approach so powerful that the Court is inspired to adopt it as its own.
This is the stuff of law professor dreams. Such dreams are rarely fulfilled.
Surely, most such briefs sparkle briefly and then expire, forgotten if
not unnoticed. 0 9
Although antitrust has its share of examples of amicus briefs that
sought to cause profound change and appeared simply not to connect,'10
should not set sail on a sea of speculation in a prophetic effort to tell whether the resulting
injury is offset by asserted benefits to interbrand competition." Petitioners Brief at 39-40,
GTE Sylvania. "To require the jury to struggle with such a non-justiciable issue, would
enhance the risk of irrational or invidious decisions." Id. at 26. Respondent tut-tutted that
"concern over judicial efficiency is no substitute for reasoned antitrust policy," and sug-
gested that the process of netting out competitive effect was no more difficult than other
challenges that confront antitrust tribunals. Respondent's Brief at 48-49; see also IFA
Amicus at 29-30 ("Finally the nature of the inuiry into the reasonableness of a vertical
territorial restraint is well understood.") (listing series of factors to consider). The Court
agreed with Respondent that such balancing was a proper judicial function. 433 U.S. at
57 n.27.
Although amici did not shed much light on just how courts were to engage in the
assigned balancing,, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association was more transparent
than the Respondent or the Court about the likely outcome of such an approach, namely,
near-per se legality for nonprice vertical restraints: Judged under the rule of reason, "such
restraints will ordinarily be upheld, since the manufacturer will normally employ them to
increase efficiency, competition, and consumer welfare. ... [A]bsent unusual circum-
stances that give a plausible reason to expect anticompetitive effects, genuinely vertical
restraints imposed by a manufacturer on the scope or focus of dealer sales efforts should
be upheld as reasonable." Motor Vehicle Amicus at 44. Indeed, MVMA argued that "since
the primary (though improbable) anticompetitive danger is that ostensibly vertical restric-
tions may occasionally turn out to be horizontal restraints instigated by dealers and forced
by them on the manufacturer, there is probably less necessity for antitrust scrutiny of
marketing restrictions imposed by large and powerful manufacturers." Id. at 46 n.77.
101 One of many such examples is provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993), an unusually complicated international insurance antitrust case that
attracted a glamorous crop of amici participants, most of whom cannot claim to have
been ultimately persuasive. See Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court, supra note 9, at
355 et seq.
110 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent, at 3 (ten
antitrust professors vainly urged the Court to affirm the court of appeals and adopt "harsh
treatment" for any "agreement to eliminate a competitor from the market"), NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998), 1996 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1570, at *6-*9 (June
23, 1998); Brief for the Service Station Dealers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance (attempting to interest the Court in a claimed link between franchiser power
and maximum RPM), State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). For a Solicitor General
brief recommending a mode of analysis that the Court ignored in its opinion, see Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal (Nov. 15, 1994), Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284 (1984) (recommending "quick look" treatment for group
boycott cases); cf. Transcript of Oral Argument (Justices expressed uneasiness with
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antitrust also has its share of briefs that suggested an analytical structure
that was consistent with the thinking of the Court. Examples include
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,"'I McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,
Inc.," 2 and, from the Bill Baxter years, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.,113 Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters,"4 and the concurrence in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde.115 The Baxter years also saw the controversial amicus
brief in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.," 6 whose prescription
of rule of reason treatment for resale price maintenance so inflamed
Congress that the Division was forbidden from expending resources to
advance the position"17-but whose cautions about the risks of too-
quickly finding RPM agreements may have influenced the Court to issue
what is now widely understood as a very pro-defendant decision. 118 Those
approach), Northwest Wholesale Stationers.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), the Court agreed with
the Solicitor General (for the Antitrust Division and the FTC) that the court of appeals's
judgment should be reversed and private plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief required to
show a threat of antitrust injury, but it squarely rejected the SG's recommendation that
it "adopt in effect a per se rule 'denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on
the basis of predatory pricing theories."' 479 U.S. at 121 (quoting Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 25). The Court wrote that there was ample evidence that
predatory pricing occurs, and, even if it occurs infrequently, "[i] t would be novel indeed
for a court to deny standing to a party seeking an injunction against threatened injury
merely because such injuries rarely occur." 479 U.S. at 121. As Justice Scalia observed
during an oral argument in which the Court was conspicuously unreceptive to the Govern-
ment's views, the equivalent would be "to say, it's very unlikely that a little man will beat
up a big man; and therefore, we will not allow any tort actions by big men asserting that
they've been assaulted by little men." 1986 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 22, at 20 (Oct. 16, 1986)
(Scalia identified in oralist's answer). (At the end of that argument, counsel for plaintiff
was explaining that he had "looked at Professor Areeda" and concluded that standing for
a competitor was not a serious question. The Court's last word was, unhappily for counsel,
"The Professor is on your opponent's brief." Id. at *46).
" 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
112 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
113 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
114459 U.S. 519 (1983).
115466 U.S. 2, 54 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
117 Congress responded to the Division's call for an end of the per se rule against RPM
(in the SG's brief on the petition and his brief on the merits) by preventing the Justice
Department from expending funds to advance this position. Justice O'Connor ended
Assistant Attorney General Baxter's oral argument by wryly asking, "Mr. Baxter, had Con-
gress not adopted the proviso in its appropriation act, would you have made possibly a
different argument to us today?" Baxter responded, "We have not withdrawn part 2(b)
of our brief, Justice O'Connor. Beyond that I would prefer not to deal with that question."
1983 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 18, at *21. See Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Mainte-
nance Reexamined: Monsanto v. Spray-Rite (1984), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE
ROLE OF EcONOMIcs 400, 418 (John E. Kwoka,Jr. & LawrenceJ. White eds., 2d ed. 1994).
118 See Baxter, supra note 24, at xvii-xix; see also id. at xix ("the opinion in Monsanto
will assist lower courts in disposing of a substantial fraction of cases involving harmless
distributional restraints with a sensible result if not with a sensible opinion").
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years also saw the start of the amicus aiding of the development of the
"quick look," which merits separate attention.
A. CANTOR V. DETROIT EDISON
Amici assistance is most likely to be critical when a litigant fails to
connect with the interests of the Court. This happened in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co.,119 the state action case that ruled that a Michigan
utility's supplying of light bulbs to its customers was not exempt from
the antitrust laws even though included in a state regulatory tariff. The
lawyer for petitioner drug store commenced his oral argument with
an exegesis on "lamps,"'120 and never really recovered. To the obvious
exasperation of the Court, he spent almost all of his time arguing that
the Michigan Public Service Commission, the district court, and the
court or appeals had all erred in concluding that the Commission had
state-law authority to approve the challenged light bulb distribution
plan. 121
The real deliberations concerned the view of Solicitor General Robert
Bork (with AAG Thomas Kauper). The Court asked Respondent's coun-
sel whether he agreed with the SG's interpretation of Parker v. Brown,122
it asked about the SG's argument that previous changes in the utility's
program had not led to changes in the tariff, 2 and counsel for a group
of Michigan utilities who was permitted to argue made clear that his
The essence of Monsanto is in the Court's highlighting of "two important distinctions"-
between "concerted and independent action" and "between concerted action to set prices
and concerted action on nonprice restrictions"-and in its requirement of "evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors
were acting independently." 465 U.S. at 760-61 & 764. The brief that this most strongly
echoes is the SG's brief supporting the petition for certiorari. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5 & 8, available in LEXIS ("Section
l's crucial distinction between collective and unilateral conduct .... ; "distinction between
'non-price' and 'price-related' vertical restrictions"; "To infer concerted action ... thus
requires a showing that the conduct is not in the individual self-interest of the participants,
acting independently, and is in their collective self-interest only when they coordinate
their actions.") (footnote omitted).
119 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
120 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, reprinted in 36 PHILIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD
CASPER EDS., ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955 TERM-1975 TERM at 923 (1979).
121 Transcript at 5 ("But presumably the Michigan Public Service Company has decided
it had that authority, Judge Feikens, who was a Michigan lawyer sitting on the bench in
Detroit, ruled against you; the Sixth Circuit which handles a lot of Michigan cases likewise
ruled against you. You wouldn't ask this Court to superimpose its judgment of Michigan
law against them would you?"). When counsel finally mentioned Parker v. Brown, the Court
wryly noted, "It's the relevant issue here; you may as well argue it." Id. at 8.
122 Id. at 22.
1"3 Id. at 24.
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purpose was to join issue with the SG.124 The SG argued that the mere
fact that a state commission had encapsulated its acquiescence in an
order did not make private compliance therewith sufficiently compelled,
and the Court agreed. 25
B. MCLAIN V. REAL ESTATE BOARD
Petitioners in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.2 6 submit-
ted a fact-specific brief arguing that the challenged restraint affected
commerce. In contrast, Judge Easterbrook, then-Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, challenged the Court to take seriously its language about the reach
of the Sherman Act. 27 The Government's brief opened by discussing
the reach of the Sherman Act, reviewed the incredible breadth of Con-
gressional power, and then described the real estate business's effect on
interstate commerce. The brief concluded: "Congress thus has the power,
under the Commerce Clause, to regulate the affairs of real estate brokers.
And because the Sherman Act expresses all the power Congress possesses,
it applies to the market in realty services."'' 28
The Supreme Court apparently was impressed with this argument.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion noted the breadth of the Commerce
Clause and the "corresponding broad reach of the Sherman Act." 29 The
Court then seemed to adopt the Solicitor General's view that it was
sufficient that the brokerage business be in interstate commerce:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it
would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect
124 Id. at 38; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of the
Michigan Utilities Group at 20-25, 31-39 (extensive discussion of SG views).
125 428 U.S. at 598 ("We conclude that neither Michigan's approval of the tariff filed
by respondent, nor the fact that the lamp-exchange program may not be terminated until
a new tariff is filed, is a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal antitrust
laws for that program.") (footnote omitted).
126 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
127 Letter from Judge Frank H. Easterbrook to Stephen Calkins (Sept. 9, 1991) (on file
with author) (The brief was written "to see whether the Supreme Court was willing to
take seriously its oft-repeated, but never followed assertion that the Sherman Act exercises
Congress' full powers under the Commerce Clause." If the Sherman Act does exercise that
power, that should virtually end the discussion. "And if the Sherman Act exercises less
than the whole national power, I hoped the Court would say so and stop the pretense.").
1'2 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, text accompanying n. 18, McLain, 444
U.S. 232 (1982). Easterbrook explained that "if the Sherman Act expresses all of the
power Congress has to exercise, and if, as the Court of Appeals held, the Sherman Act
does not apply to the activities of brokers at all, it must follow that Congress has no power
over brokers. That seems an extraordinary proposition .... McLain, 1979 U.S. Transcript
LEXIS 16 (Nov. 6, 1979).
'2 444 U.S. at 241.
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on interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity.
Petitioners need not make the more particularized showing of an effect
on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commis-
sion rates, or by those other aspects of respondents' activity that are
alleged to be unlawful.1 30
Moreover, the Court's application of this legal standard considered
merely the real estate business in general, and easily concluded that
plaintiffs deserved to be heard at trial.
Had the Court stopped there, the dicta about the reach of the Sherman
Act would have prevailed, and the commerce requirement would have
been stripped of its importance. The Court continued, however:
To establish federal jurisdiction in this case, there remains only the
requirement that respondents' activities which allegedly have been infected
by a price-fixing conspiracy be shown "as a matter of practical econom-
ics" to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce
involved .... [T]he broker charges a fee generally calculated as a per-
centage of the sale price. Brokerage activities necessarily affect both
the frequency and the terms of residential sales transactions. Ultimately,
whatever stimulates or retards the volume of residential sales, or has
an impact on the purchase price, affects the [interstate] demand for
financing and title insurance.... Where, as here, the services of respon-
dent real estate brokers are often employed in the relevant market,
petitioners at trial may be able to show that respondents' activities have
a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce."'
It is not clear what the Court meant by "infected" activities (in the
first quoted sentence) or by "respondents' activities" (in the last quoted
sentence),3' and, thereafter, confusion reigned in the lower courts. 33
To the surprise of many observers, in Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas1"4 the
Court refused substantially to retrench its position on antitrust and
interstate commerce. Cases continue to rely on McLain to establish Con-
'-' Id. at 242-43. The Court said this approach was supported by two considerations
from the case law, namely, that a per se violation can be based on "purpose" rather than
effect, and that a plaintiff can qualify for injunctive relief without proof of "legally cogniza-
ble damages." Id. at 243.
131 Id. at 246 (emphases added).
132 The word "infected" does not appear in the McLain briefs or oral argument transcript,
or, to my knowledge, in previous cases. "Where 'infected' came from only Warren Burger
and his clerks know." Letter from Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 127.
133 E.g., Neil P. Motenko, Establishing Interstate Commerce, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE LAw 227 (Phillip Proger, Roxane Busey & Tina Miller eds., 1990) (reviewing
cases); Bruce Little, Note, A Case of Judicial Backsliding: Artificial Restraints on the Commerce
Power Reach of the Sherman Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 163 (reviewing cases).
'- 500 U.S. 322 (1991); see Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term, supra note 9,
at 618-37.
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gress's intent in the Sherman Act was to extend jurisdiction to the outer
bounds of the Commerce power, 35 perhaps thanks in part to an amicus.
C. ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS
Few briefing patterns are more suggestive of amici influence than that
of the leading antitrust standing case, Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters.136 Petitioner pre-
sented the Court with what was principally a labor-antitrust case. Three
of the four questions presented addressed labor antitrust, as did five of
the six points Petitioner made in its summary of argument. 37 Its last
point called for the Court to reject the "zone of interests" test of standing
and, applying the "target area" test, conclude that plaintiff unions were
too far removed. 138
In the hands of several amici, Associated General Contractors was a very
different case. In particular, the Solicitor General (with AAG Baxter),
although arguing that defendants had restrained trade and were not
immune from antitrust scrutiny, devoted substantial space to arguing
that the unions lacked standing. The SG urged the Court to look to the
policy reasons informing standing decisions, but to use a multi-factor
test rather than the tests used by the lower courts. After plaintiff had
made a minimal showing, the SG would make a "prudential" evaluation
of factors, such as (1) "whether the damages are speculative and very
difficult of proof;" (2) "whether there is a serious risk of duplicative
recoveries;" and (3) "whether there exists another class of potential
plaintiffs" whose claims were more manageable.139 Similarly, a trade asso-
ciation amicus supporting defendants argued first that there was no
standing under a "target area" test, and then that antitrust policy reasons
counsel against letting a union sue for derivative loss from harm directly
to its members. 40 Another such association wrote at length about the
policy reasons making it important to limit antitrust standing. 4' When
Justice Stevens for the Court wrote about "the strong interest ... in
135 See, e.g., United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1141 (1999); Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College, 128 F.3d
59 (2d Cir. 1997) (college residency plan could affect commerce).
136459 U.S. 519 (1983).
137 Brief of Petitioner at 1, 6-8, (Feb. 27, 1982), available in LEXIS.
131 Id. at 26-29.
139 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 16 (May 7, 1982),
available in LEXIS.
140 Brief of Pacific Maritime Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 12-15 (Feb. 25, 1982), available
in LEXIS.
4I Motion of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. for Leave to File a
BriefAmicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 9-14 (Feb. 25, 1982), available in LEXIS.
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keeping the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable
limits" and about the multiple factors that must be considered as part
of an antitrust standing analysis, 4 2 he wrote words much more in har-
mony with these amicus efforts than with the litigants' work.
D. COPPERWELD
The Solicitor General's amicus briefs also appeared to be key to the
Court's opinion in Copperweld. Copperweld's petition for certiorari set
forth a straightforward position: There is "disarray among the circuits";
Supreme Court clarification is needed; and there is a "principled and
practical alternative to the existing confusion."1 4 3 The petition sought a
narrow response to a narrow question.
The SG's amicus brief on the petition, for the Antitrust Division and
the FTC, took a different approach. The heart of antitrust doctrine, the
brief argued, is the application of "more stringent legal standards for
multiparty conduct than for unilateral action."'4 In words that would
be echoed by the Court, the brief contrasted Sherman Act Sections 1
and Section 2. Under the latter, "there is no violation unless analysis of
market structure and conduct indicates the presence of at least a danger-
ous probability of monopolization."'145 "The difficulty with the intraenter-
prise conspiracy of doctrine is that it evaluates conduct within a single
competitive unit by the stringent standard for conspiracy cases, simply
on the basis of an enterprise's choice of corporate form.' 46 Although,
as always, causation is uncertain, it may be sufficient to say that there
are obvious parallels between the Court's opinion and the SG's lead. 14 7
142 459 U.S. at 543, 545 (factors include "the nature of the Union's injury, the tenuous
and speculative character of the relationship between the alleged antitrust violation and the
Union's alleged injury, the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
damages, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged conspiracy").
1413 Petition for Certiorari, Cotperweld, headings L.A & I.C (Jan. 28, 1983), available in
LEXIS, Federal Legal-U.S.: Supreme Court cases and materials: US Supreme Court Briefs).
For its "practical alternative," petitioners urged the Court to hold that no agreement
among parents and wholly owned subsidiaries can violate Sherman Act § 1. "This rule
would recognize that, where there is a complete unity of legal and economic interests, a
parent and subsidiary should be viewed as a single enterprise." Petition at text under
heading II.C.
144 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (May 31, 1983),
available in LEXIS. The same distinction was highlighted in an article Professor Areeda
published in the December 1983 Harvard Law Review. See Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine in Decline, 97 HARV. L. Rv. 451, 454-56 (1983).
145 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (May 31, 1983),
available in LEXIS (citations omitted).
146 Id.
147 See Calkins, Copperweld, supra note 9, at 349-50.
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E. JEFFERSON PARISH
Even if a brief, or a brief's approach, is not reflected in the opinion
toward which it is filed, it can make a difference. Many antitrust issues
are timeless, with today's resolution creating tomorrow's disagreement.
An amicus brief apparently ignored by a court nonetheless can advance
what is in effect an antitrust conversation among the courts, academics,
enforcers, and private practitioners. Amicus briefs can also make a differ-
ence by informing a concurring or dissenting opinion. One of the more
striking examples is Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.148 Justice
Stevens wrote a confusing (if not confused) opinion for the Court, in
which Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice
O'Connor wrote a clear, powerful opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which Chief Justice Burger andJustices Powell and Rehnquistjoined.
It echoes some themes in briefs of amici.
Most notably, Justice O'Connor called for abandonment of the per
se label for tying. 4 9 Even Frank Easterbrook, counsel of record for the
defendant, had not gone that far-but the Justice Department and per-
haps the Federal Trade Commission had. Very casually, in the last sen-
tence of a long paragraph, the Solicitor General's brief states that "[s] ince
the anticompetitive potential of tie-ins and exclusive dealing contracts
is basically identical, both arrangements should be judged by the same
criteria." 150 That sentence was highlighted by a vigorous rebuttal argu-
ment by another amicus.'5 ' One wonders whether Justice O'Connor
would have gone so far had the proposition not been suggested by
anyone.
Just as important, Justice O'Connor's approach to tying analysis finds
close parallels in amicus briefs. She set out three threshold criteria: (1)
"the seller must have power in the tying-product market;" (2) "there
must be a substantial threat that the tying seller will acquire market
power in the tied-product market;" and (3) "there must be a coherent
economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as distinct." 52
148 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
149 Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Jefferson Parish,
at 13 (May 14, 1983) (SG Brief), available in LEXIS (citing Tyler Baker, The Supreme Court
and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1306 (1980)). An
odd footnote to the brief said that the FTC joined in the brief first part of the brief and
"also supports the general conclusions of Section II and III, that the legal treatment of
tying arrangements should be clarified to take into account the relevant economic and
competitive factors." SG Brief at 5 n.9.
151 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc. in Support
of Respondent at 17-19 (July 8, 1983), available in LEXIS.
152 466 U.S. at 37-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The SG set forth a similar list of three "pre-conditions": (1) "that the seller
have significant economic power in the market for the tying product;" (2)
"impact on the tied product market," and (3) that there is "a realistic
threat of anticompetitive effects" justifying a two-product conclusion. 53
Justice O'Connor's conclusion turned on the third issue. "Even when
the tied product does have a use separate from the tying product, it makes
little sense to label a package as two products without also considering the
economic justifications for the sale of the package as a unit." 154 Here,
she saw substantial benefits from linking the provision of surgery and
anesthesia, and, because they were demanded together, no way that
linking them could give a hospital "additional market power." '55 The
"demanded together" point was vigorously asserted in an amicus brief
filed by the American Hospital Association.15 6 That brief and an amicus
brief that the future AAGJoel Klein filed, as well as the SG's brief, called
for examination of justifications and economic consequences as part of
choosing between one product or two.157
In contrast, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court may have suffered
from the absence of "big picture" advocacy by amici. No brief supporting
respondent sets out either the Court's "character of the demand" test
for deciding whether two products exist or any other test.5 With one
exception, no brief on either side argued that a 30 percent market share
was insufficient to support a tying violation, as the Court ruled. 59 The
briefs passed like ships in the night, disagreeing more on the issues than
153 SG Brief at 8, 11, 13.
154 466 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 43.
156 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Hospital Association in Support of the Petition-
ers at 8 n.5 (May 16, 1983), available in LEXIS.
151 Id. at 6-9 (LEXIS); Brief for the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals
as Amicus Curiae at 6-10 (May 13, 1983), available in LEXIS; SG Brief at 8-11. The SG's
brief also made important subsidiary points later made by Justice O'Connor, including
the limited probative value of patents in determining the existence of market power,
compare 466 U.S. at 37 n.7, with SG Brief at 12, and the possible specialized uses of tying
for regulatory evasion (harmful) or metering (ambivalent), compare 466 U.S. at 36 n.4,
with SC Brief at 15 n.26.
158 See 466 U.S. at 19.
1-9 Id. at 26-27. After Respondent, in an argument about geographic market definition,
noted that 70% of the hospital's patients come from the East Bank of Jefferson Parish,
Petitioner's closing rejoinder was that "even now 70% of the people who live in the East
Bank go to hospitals other than East Jefferson General," so the hospital "faces ample
competitive constraints." Reply Brief of Petitioners at 8, available in LEXIS. Two other
briefs review the 70%-go-elsewhere datum but only in connection with market definition.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Hospital Association in Support of the Petitioners
at 14; Amicus Curiae Brief [by Louisiana State Medical Society] on Behalf of the Respon-
dent at 7.
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any attempted resolution thereof, and an important antitrust opinion is
the less clear because of it.
F. FRIENDS OF THE "QUICK LOOK"
Probably the most celebrated amicus brief that did not carry the day
with the Court was the jointJustice Department-Federal Trade Commis-
sion brief in NCAA. NCAA became a leading case closely associated with
a middle form of antitrust scrutiny even though it failed to adopt or
even discuss the careful analytical structure the agencies had set out in
their brief.
In fact, amici have long played a key role in addressing the intersection
between the per se rule and the rule of reason. Perhaps the most impor-
tant contribution was the amicus brief the Solicitor General filed in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 160 the seminal
case in the debate about when agreements that affect price are not price
fixing. In response to the Court's invitation, the Justice Department filed
a powerful brief explaining why the per se rule should not apply to what
the Second Circuit had labeled price fixing.161 Although one can find
key points from the Court's subsequent opinion in the petitioners' briefs,
the SG's brief eloquently sings the melody that the Court adopted as its
own. 162 Ever since Broadcast Music, courts have struggled to separate
1- 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
161 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-22 (Nov. 27,1978), Broadcast Music.
I' Id. at 9-11 (Summary of Argument):
[A] n agreement among competitors to market a product or service fundamentally
different from anything any of them individually can market has never been found
to be price fixing under circumstances where, as here, there is no agreement not
to sell the individual products or services at any price the competitors choose,
and where the project is not a disguise for price fixing.
As the case of mergers illustrates, not every species of agreement among
competitors that somehow has an effect on price is per se illegal. The Court has
been careful to examine each species of restraint, usually after experience with
it, before determining whether it should be categorically deemed unlawful.
Several considerations preclude a determination that the agreement to market a
blanket copyright license is per se unlawful. ASCAP's blanket license is a distinctive
product, fundamentally different from any license any one of its members can
sell .... The blanket license also saves enormous costs that would otherwise be
required to transact the purchase of individual licenses for single performances,
especially in the case of music users such as radio stations that frequently play
music.
If such a comprehensive product, with its offer of savings, is to be available at
all, it must be assembled and marketed through as society such as ASCAP, and
the members of the society necessarily must agree on the price at which the
product is to be sold. Such an agreement to market a new product or service is
not illegal per se under Section 1 even though the parties set its price, because
the agreement on the price is essential if the new product or service is to be
sold at all.
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concerted action into per se and rule of reason boxes, or, perhaps, a
middle category, commonly (but unfortunately 63) referred to as the
"quick look."
NCAA was not the first SG brief to discuss the "quick look." That honor
goes to the amicus brief filed two months into AAG Baxter's tenure
as head of the Antitrust Division, in Maricopa County. The innovation,
seemingly without effect in that case, helped move forward an ongoing
discussion. Petitioner State of Arizona portrayed the case as involving
straightforward per se price fixing, not saved by involving maximum
prices or by assertions that prices were reasonable. 164 An amicus brief
filed by thirty-nine states was to the same effect. 165 Indeed, the SG's
amicus supporting the grant of certiorari took the same approach: "For
the second time in a year, the Ninth Circuit has seriously misconstrued
the per se doctrine.... It should be reversed."' 66 The SG suggested that
the Court consider summary reversal.
The SG's brief on the merits, perhaps inspired in part by Senior District
Judge Larson's unusually thoughtful dissent below, 167 took a very different
tack, although not as different as AAG Baxter would have liked. 168 The
163 See Calkins, Full Monty, supra note 9, at 544-47.
161 See Brief for Petitioner (June 5, 1981), Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
165 Brief for the States of Alabama et al., at 5 (June 5, 1981), available in LEXIS ("The
respondents' fee agreements in the present case constitute price fixing. As such, those
agreements are clearly illegal per se under the precedent established by this Court.").
166 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
3 (May 28, 1981), available in LEXIS (referencing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643 (1980)).
16TJudge Larson asked three questions: Is this the type of practice previously adjudged
per se illegal; if not, should it now be declared per se illegal; and, "[tihird, even if the
rule of reason must be applied, is the practice so plainly anticompetitive that only a
truncated rule of reason analysis need be carried out." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 643 F.2d 553, 563 (9th Cir. 1989) (Larson, J., dissenting). The "central lesson"
of National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), "appears to
be that when the nature and character of an agreement among professionals is plainly
anticompetitive, no extended analysis is necessary to find it forbidden under the Sherman
Act." 643 F.2d at 564. Although Judge Larson found per se analysis applicable, he wrote
that "even if the rule of reason is the correct standard by which to judge defendants'
activities, a detailed economic analysis of the industry is not necessary." Id. at 569.
Judge Larson's dissenting opinion is the first judicial use of the term "truncated rule
of reason." It was issued several months before the case more familiarly associated with a
middle category of antitrust analysis, United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351,
1367 (5th Cir. 1980) (relying on LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 192 (1977)), and several
years before the term "quick look" was first judicially used in Vogel v. American Society of
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1984).
168 Baxter later was to complain that the brief as drafted "consisted of a mechanical
application of past doctrinal statements of the Court," and he insisted that it be "rewritten"
to recognize "that horizontal maximum agreements could be procompetitive." Baxter,
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brief reviewed the usual sweeping condemnations of horizontal price
manipulation, but it said that "[t]hese principles provide the starting
point for analysis in this case."' 169 It elaborated as follows:
[W] hen a court is confronted with a particular agreement that appears
on its face to fall within a per se rule, but which the defendants claim
has some competitive justification, a preliminary factual inquiry may
be necessary to determine if the per se rule should be applied .... The
judicial focus of this preliminary scrutiny or "quick look" should be
limited to ascertaining whether the proponents of the agreement have
identified significant procompetitive effects achieved through integra-
tion of productive capacity that are unattainable in the absence of the
agreement. Only if such effects are found would further inquiry under
the rule of reason be warranted.
The brief references Judge Larson's opinion below as well as Judge
Bork's Antitrust Paradox.7 ° It concludes that "[t]he agreements at issue,
whether given a quick look under the per se rule or subjected to a limited
inquiry under the rule of reason, violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 7'
The Court's opinion in Maricopa County shows scant evidence of bene-
fiting from the SG's innovative brief. At oral argument, Stephen Shapiro,
Assistant to the Solicitor General, endorsed application of the per se
rule but devoted much of his time to a more nuanced presentation.
Making the now-familiar comparison to law firm partnerships, he posited
a two-part inquiry that asks whether an agreement is "an essential facet
of joint productive activity."'' 7 2 The Court, which peppered the other two
oralists with an almost unbroken stream of questions, responded to Mr.
Shapiro's argument with almost none. If nothing else, they heard an
articulation of something other than a straight per se approach.
Even if the SG's Maricopa amicus effort is not reflected in the Court's
opinion, it was not, as they say, in vain. It is obviously a precursor to the
ambitious amicus brief that the Solicitor General, with the Federal Trade
Commission, filed in NCAA. 173 Relying on, among other things, the work
supra note 24, at xvi. He did not return to the brief until it had been filed as revised-
in a form that, although it "complied minimally" with his instructions, was "totally unsatisfac-
tory to me." Id.
16' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 8 (emphasis added). Although Bill
Baxter formally took office only on March 30, 1981, he began working at the Division in
late January. See Schmalensee, supra note 108, at 1323.
170 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
"I Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15 (LEXIS).
17 1981 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 10, *26-*27 (Nov. 4, 1981).
173 Earlier steps were taken by the Federal Trade Commission. See American Med. Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. 701, 1004 (1979) (Clanton, Comm'r) ("the contours of the analysis required
under the rule or reason will vary somewhat depending upon the nature of the restraint"),
aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982);
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of Professors Sullivan and Areeda, 174 the SG advocated a "middle ground"
that he referred to variously as an "abbreviated" and a "truncated" rule
of reason:
[C]ourts should first ask whether challenged conduct is likely, absent
an efficiency justification,* to lead to the restriction of output, for such
conduct is inherently suspect. Where output restriction does appear
likely, we must ask whether there is a plausible efficiency justification
for the practice, i.e., is there reason to believe that the restraint may
nonetheless have significant efficiency benefits and therefore enhance
competition and output. In the event that there is no plausible efficiency
justification, the suspect practice is per se illegal ....
But, in cases where the participants raise a plausible efficiency justifi-
cation for conduct that is facially suspect, per se characterization is
inappropriate, because more scrutiny is needed to evaluate the
restraint's overall competitive effect. It may be that further examination
will show that the proffered efficiency justification should be rejected;
in that event, the conduct can still be condemned as unreasonable
without completing a "full" rule of reason analysis that includes market
definition and market power determinations. On the other hand, if
efficiency benefits are shown to be likely, a more elaborate rule of
reason inquiry is called for, with a thorough analysis of market power,
in order to determine whether the practice is, on balance, harmful
or beneficial. 175
Here, again, the Court failed to follow closely the Government's lead.
The Court quoted with approval the Government's brief to support its
holding that "[t]his naked restraint on price and output requires some
competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market analy-
sis."1 76 But this was a far cry from adopting the carefully structured
approach the Government had advanced; indeed, the Court proceeded
to find that the NCAA in fact had market power. 177
The Solicitor General and the Antitrust Division tried again to promote
the "quick look" by making it the central thrust of their amicus brief in
Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 292 (1983) (Clanton, Comm'r) ("Where
horizontal arrangements so closely relate to prices or fees as they do here, a less elaborate
analysis of competitive effects is required.") (citing Professional Engineers).
174 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 7 n.6 (Jan.
17,1984) (citing LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 192 (1977), NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1968); Phillip Areeda, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues
37-38 (Federal Judicial Center June 1981)).
* An efficiency justification exists if the challenged restraint increases the quantity or
quality, or reduces the cost, of overall output-e.g., by creating a new product, improving
the operation of a market, or reducing production or marketing costs-and is reasonably
necessary to achieve such efficiencies.
175 Amicus Brief, supra note 174, at n.9 (footnote in original).
176468 U.S. at 110 & n.42.
177 Id. at 111-13.
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Northwest Wholesale Stationers. 178Justices expressed obvious discomfort with
the idea during oral argument,"' and the Court's opinion ignores the
concept. 180
Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission, which had joined in the
SG's NCAA amicus brief, built upon that approach and formally adopted
a structured series of questions in Massachusetts Board of Registration in
OptometryY18 Later that same year the Antitrust Division issued a new
version of its Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions. These formally set forth the Division's somewhat different struc-
tured set of questions, which the Division said it would apply in making
a rule of reason analysis of a joint venture. 182 The Commission then
backed away from its Mass. Board approach in its opinion in California
178 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
pt.2.a. (Aug. 31, 1984) (Ninth Circuit seriously erred by applying per se rule rather than
"quick look" but Court should deny certiorari), available in LEXIS; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 6 (LEXIS), Northwest Wholesale (Nov. 15,
1984) ("[A] court faced with an alleged group boycott must take a quick look at the
likelihood' of anticompetitive consequences and the plausibility of any asserted efficiency-
related justification before characterizing the activity as the sort of boycott to which the
per se rule applies.") (footnote omitted), available in LEXIS.
i79Justice O'Connor asked, "[W]hen does the so-called quick look that you espouse
shade into the closer look of a rule of reason? It seems to me that there is a shading there
that is a little difficult to understand or apply for courts." She further asked whether a
court should "have a mini-rule of reason trial to determine whether to apply the rule of
reason."Justice White asked how, if "the so-called quick look review" reveals "good faith
differences of opinion," anything could be found per se illegal. He wondered whether a
"quick look" review wouldn't be tantamount to a rule of reason trial. 1985 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 74, at 18-20 & 23 (Feb. 19, 1985); see Supreme Court Considers Expulsion of Member
from Purchasing Cooperative, 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 349 (identifyingJustices).
"I Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
181 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (Calvani, Comm'r):
First, we ask whether the restraint is "inherently suspect." In other words, is the
practice the kind that appears likely, absent an efficiencyjustification, to "restrict
competition and decrease output"?... If the restraint is not inherently suspect,
then the traditional rule of reason, with attendant issues of market definition
and power, must be employed. But if it is inherently suspect, we must pose a
second question: Is there a plausible efficiency justification for the practice? That
is, does the practice seem capable of creating or enhancing competition (e.g.,
by reducing the costs of producing or marketing the product, creating a new
product, or improving.the operation of the market)? Such an efficiency defense
is plausible if it cannot be rejected without extensive factual inquiry. If it is not
plausible, then the restraint can be quickly condemned. But if the efficiency
justification is plausible, further inquiry--a third inquiry-is needed to determine
whether the justification is really valid. If it is, it must be assessed under the full
balancing test of the rule of reason. But if the justification is, on examination,
not valid, then the practice is unreasonable and unlawful under the rule of
reason without further inquiry-there are no likely benefits to offset the threat
to competition.
182 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109, at 20,600.
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DentalAssociation,183 whereupon AAGJoel Klein unveiled ajustice Depart-
ment approach that departed sharply from the Division's former
approach and adopted a series of questions that bore some resemblance
to those in Mass. Board.184
In what now seems to have been a mistake, the Division and the FTC
relied on AAG Klein's "stepwise approach" to argue that the Second
Circuit's decision in Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Cop., 185 that a two-firm vertical
agreement not to deal could be illegal without proof of anticompetitive
effect, was consistent with the agencies' view of settled law.186 After the
Court, unpersuaded, granted certiorari, private amici vehemently
objected that the agencies' approach would "turn [] the ordinary antitrust
burden of proof upside down. ' 187 In fact, after the Court decided to
hear the merits, the agencies jointly recommended that the Second
Circuit's judgment be vacated,188 and the Court did so. Even before the
Court's NYNEX opinion issued in December 1998, however, the Court
had granted certiorari in California Dental Association v. FFC (CDA)1 89 and
received amicus briefs on the merits of that case that blended AAG
Klein's "stepwise approach" and the Commission's CDA opinion and
characterized them as a threat to sound antitrust policy.' The give
183 California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996).
184 Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, A Stepwise
Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address Before the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law (Nov. 7, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
jikaba.htm, reprinted in [Current Comment] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,157.
185 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
186 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae on
the Petition for Certiorari at 16-17 (Feb. 1998), NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., (citations
omitted), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl600/1612.htm.:
[T]he approach suggested by the court of appeals here is consistent with that
suggested by this Court's opinions in Indiana Federation of Dentists, supra, and
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In those cases, the Court indicated
that, once the defendants' conduct has been shown to be anticompetitive based
on its character or its effects, the conduct will be deemed to be unreasonable
without any extensive market analysis, unless the defendants advance an adequate
procompetitive justification.
'8 Brief of Amicus Curiae GTE Corporation in Support of Petitioners at 7 (June 1,
1998), available in LEXIS; see also Brief for the Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners (May 29, 1998) (protesting DOJ/FTC brief), available in LEXIS.
188 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Vacating the Judgment (June 17, 1998).
189 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
190 Brief for the NCAA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, 1998 W L 789350
*11-*12, *17-*18 (Nov. 10, 1998). The brief, and, later, the Court, 119 S. Ct. at 1617
n.15, cited an unusually vigorous and insightful "point"-"counterpoint" debate, Joel I.
Klein, Point: A "Stepwise" Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements Will Provide a Much
Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 41; William J. Kolasky, Jr.,
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and take did not provide the most favorable litigating context for the
Commission, although it did help elucidate the agencies' and the
courts' thinking.
Now, the Supreme Court has muddied the waters further with its
disappointing opinion in CDA. Part of the confusion and potential mis-
chief from CDA stems from the Court's repeated use of the word "plausi-
ble," as in its observation that "CDA's advertising restrictions might
plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect."'191 A vigorous
amicus brief filed by the NCAA had focused on the word "plausible"
and argued repeatedly that "full rule-of-reason analysis must supersede
the 'quick look' review if the defendant presents a plausible procompeti-
tive justification."'192 If that brief helped cause the Court to refer so
frequently to plausibility, it did not serve antitrust doctrine well' 93 but it
would serve as another example of amici shaping antitrust discussions.
That is not the end of the discussion, however; far from from it. The
antitrust community will apply and interpret California Dental.194 The
antitrust agencies were especially quick to do so, in their Antitrust Guide-
lines for Collaboration Among Competitors. 95 The Guidelines provide
a vehicle for the agencies to rebound from the CDA defeat by setting forth
their interpretation of that controversial case. The discussion continues.
VII. CONCLUSION
The antitrust law that we know and apply is almost certainly richer
and different because of the active participation of amici. For more than
a score of years, amici have regularly participated in shaping antitrust
doctrine. By taking possibly surprising positions (and sometimes remain-
ing surprisingly quiet), through important research, by credibly high-
lighting egregious errors, by supplying context and special emphasis,
and, sometimes, by helping set forth an analytical approach, they have
made a difference. Amici are essential participants in the antitrust
conversation.
Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's "Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on
Parties to Horizontal Agreements, ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 31.
191 526 U.S. at 771; see Calkins, Full Monty, supra note 9, at 533. The author was General
Counsel of the FrC when the Commission decided California Dental.
192 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Reversal, 1998 W L 789350 at *5.
193 See Calkins, Full Monty, supra note 9, at 549-50.
"I The Ninth Circuit recently ordered the complaint dismissed, which (if not successfully
appealed) will end the specific dispute. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942 (9th
Cir. 2000).
"I Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O00/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
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